# ARTICLE III
# Addressing the objections against this mystery raised by heretics and unbelievers.

Against this Catholic truth, arguments and difficulties can be raised from four main sources:

**First,** from Scripture passages which heretics seem to be moved by.

**Second,** from a special repugnance of the divine nature to this distinction of Persons.

**Third,** from the fact that this mystery seems to destroy evident and necessary principles of natural light.

**Fourth,** from certain sophisms which seem to be introduced by the assertion of such a mystery, which are used by Valentinus Gentilis and other modern Arians and Sabellians of our time.

## SCRIPTURE PASSAGES EXPLAINED

First, certain passages can be objected which positively seem to attribute inferiority to the Son of God compared to the Father, and call Him a creature.

Second, other passages which seem to weaken those by which we wish to establish His divinity and consubstantiality. And it should be noted that almost the same passages which they strive to prove that Christ and the Holy Spirit are not God, but only the Father is, serve for the Sabellians to prove that there is only one Person in God who is truly God, not many.

I. Of the first kind are those passages which affirm Christ to be less and inferior to the Father, as is said in John 14: "Because the Father is greater than I"; and the Apostle says of the Son in 1 Corinthians 15: "When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to him who put all things in subjection under him." Which certainly cannot be understood of the assumed human nature: for in this He was much more subject to Him before His glorification than when He will show all power given to Him. Likewise He is called a creature, in Ecclesiasticus 1: "Wisdom was created before all things"; and in chapter 24: "The Creator of all things, and He who created me, rested in my tabernacle"; and in the same chapter: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, firstborn before all creation"; and the Apostle in Colossians 1: "Who is the firstborn of all creation." In these passages, mention is made of the Son, not by reason of incarnation, but in Himself, and as

proceeding from God, and yet He is named a creature. If therefore we make the argument that because He is named God, He must be understood as the true God, why similarly from the fact that He is named a creature, will He not be understood as a true creature in all propriety?

This is confirmed first, because Scripture attributes divinity to the Father alone: therefore it excludes the Son from it, and thus there will be given only one divine Person. The antecedent is proved from John 17: "This is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent," where only the Father is named the true God, even in comparison with Jesus Christ who was sent: therefore, He is excluded from the notion of true God. And the Apostle in 1 Timothy, last chapter, speaking of Christ in comparison to the Father, says: "Which in due time He will show who is the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone has immortality and dwells in unapproachable light." Therefore, it is against Scripture to wish to make another God, if only the Father is God.

This is confirmed secondly, because ignorance of the day of judgment is attributed to the Son, in Mark 13: "But about that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father." Powerlessness is also attributed to Him, in Matthew 20: "To sit at my right hand and at my left is not mine to grant to you, but it is for those for whom it has been prepared by my Father"; and in John 5: "The Son can do nothing by himself, but only what he sees the Father doing." Therefore, He in Himself is not God: for thus He would do things by Himself. And in consequence of this, the Son is said to hear from the Father, and the Father to show Him and deliver all things to Him; which certainly supposes that He is not God, but is in Himself needy and lacking what is given to Him by God. But if it is said that the Son does, and creates, and works what the Father does, nevertheless not in a divine manner, but instrumentally and inferiorly, as when He is said to make the ages, through Him are all things, but not from Him, where the particle "through" designates ministry and inferiority.

II. It is answered that those authorities which affirm the Son to be less than the Father, speak of the Son in the assumed nature, in which He was made less, not only with respect to the Father, but also a little less than the angels, namely in the passible nature, in which nature He is also called the Father's servant not by a servitude that is vile originating from sin, but by a general servitude of every created thing, and similarly He is said to obey the Father, and to receive a command from Him, etc. And from the text itself it is clear that Christ speaks in this sense when He says: "The Father is greater than I," for He had premised: "If you loved me, you would rejoice that I am going to the Father, because the Father is greater than I." But to go to the Father is only appropriate to the Son in the assumed nature, for in His own nature He does not go or move to the Father, but is always

in Him. Similarly, when the Apostle says that then also the Son will be subject to Him, he manifestly speaks of the Son as man; for the Apostle in the preceding words speaks of the resurrection of Christ, which certainly belongs to Him as man, and of the kingdom which He will hand over to the Father when He has destroyed every rule and power, which kingdom he says will be such that all things will be subject under His feet. Which subjection will certainly be made through divine operation, which will subject all things to Christ as man, according to Philippians 3: "Who will transform our lowly body to be like his glorious body, by the power that enables him even to subject all things to himself." That operation, therefore, subjecting all things to Christ as man will be divine operation, not human. Hence, when all things will be thus subject to Christ, then the Son Himself in the same human nature in which He rose, and in which all things will be subject to Him, will also be subject to God Himself, because it will be manifested that that operation does not proceed from the humanity of Christ except as an instrument of divinity, which if it is His instrument: therefore it is also subject. Therefore, such a clarity of Christ as man will appear, that it will be shown that the humanity itself is an instrument conjoined to divinity for the universal administration of all things insofar as it subjects all things to itself, and thus the Son as man will be subject to Him who subjects all things to Himself, as the principal instrument, that God may be all in all, that is, that all things may be attributed to God. But now, although a greater subjection of Christ appeared in suffering, yet not a greater subjection to God in acting, and in subjecting all things to Himself, as then it will appear, when Christ as man from subordination to the operation and influence of God subjects all things to Himself. See St. Thomas on this passage of Paul in 1 Corinthians 15 and in Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 8.

III. To what is said that the Word, or Son of God is called a creature, it is answered according to St. Thomas at the end of the said chapter 8 and in Part I, q. 41, art. 3, ad 3, where he teaches that those authorities which say wisdom is created, speak not of the wisdom which is the Son, but of the wisdom which He instilled in creatures, as is said in Ecclesiasticus 1: "He himself created it [namely wisdom] in the Holy Spirit, and poured it out upon all his works." And wisdom is said to be created first, namely in the angels, who are the first creatures. But if some authorities speak specifically of the wisdom which is the Son and proceeds from God, and call it created, they speak of the Son in the assumed human nature, as when it is said: "He who created me, rested in my tabernacle." But the tabernacle of the Creator was the humanity and body of Christ. But as St. Thomas says in the place just cited, the procession of the Word is sometimes called in the Scriptures generation, sometimes creation, so that from both something of perfection may be taken, to fully explain that generation: for generation communicates the same substance to the generated, but with mutation; creation communicates a different substance to the creature, but without mutation of the creator. But the procession of the Word is without mutation in the same substance-generation. This exposition was of a certain oriental Council, as St. Thomas cited reports from Hilary in the book on Synods. But when He is

called "firstborn before all creation," and "firstborn of all creation," if it is referred to the Son in the divine nature, He is called the firstborn of all creation, because He is the Son, and not a creature. For if with respect to all creation, or all collection of creatures He is firstborn, certainly He is outside all creation. Hence then the construction of the letter is: "I, firstborn, came forth from the mouth of the Most High before all creation," so that "before all creation" is construed with "came forth." And in Paul, that causal is to be noted: "Firstborn of all creation, because in him all things were created." If He is therefore called firstborn, because in Him all things were created: therefore He Himself is not created, but only begotten, because He created all things. But if it is understood of the Son in human nature, He is called the firstborn of all creation, because He is the first predestined: for of Him it is written in the beginning of the book, and in Him God chose the rest of the elect; and thus He precedes all creation as the head of all, and prince, and firstborn. And from this is taken the disparity, for which the argument insists: Why if Scripture calls the Son God, and calls Him a creature, do we understand Him to be God in all propriety, but not a creature, except only in the assumed nature? We say the reason is ready at hand, because if His proper nature were a creature, it could not be verified that He is God: for neither through the assumption of nature can He be God, but if He is God, necessarily and from eternity He is God. Therefore, it is necessary that if He is called God, and creature, the second is said in the assumed nature, and not in His own: for thus it would be falsified that He is God. But He can be verified as a creature only through the assumption of nature newly made. And He is suitably called a creature, notwithstanding that in Himself He is God, to show what He has deigned to be for us, and to insinuate the mystery of incarnation, together with that of predestination, because constituted and created in human nature, He is the head of all men and angels, and of all creation. But what is predestined is said to be created, because from no merits, and by gratuitous benefit, it is granted and prepared, and to be thus prepared is to be created.

IV. To the first confirmation, it is answered that in that passage: "That they may know you, the only true God," "only" can be taken either as an adverb, or as an adjective noun. In the first way, there is no difficulty, because it makes the sense that the Father only is God, but Christ whom He sent is not only God, but also man; but the Father is nothing other than God. In the second way, the sense is also easy, and is taken from Chrysostom on this passage of John and Ambrose in book 5 on faith, chapter 2: "That they may know you, the only true God with Christ whom you have sent," as if He alone with Christ whom He sent is the true God, not He alone without Christ. And in "whom you sent" is also understood the Holy Spirit because He sent Christ as man according to Isaiah 48: "And now the Lord God has sent me and his Spirit." Just as also in 1 Corinthians 9, it is said: "Is it only I and Barnabas who have no right," as if to say: Only I with Barnabas, where Barnabas is not excluded by "only," but is added and joined to him; and it is a common way of speaking, as when I say: Only I and Peter did this or that. Wherefore the exclusive "only" even adjectivally never

excludes the three Persons, because they are inseparably in essence, but excludes extraneous persons. And thus when it is said that He alone has immortality, He alone is powerful, etc., "only" does not exclude the divine Persons from the consortium of immortality and power, but created persons, and it says that God who is those three Persons has immortality, etc.

V. To the second confirmation, it is said that the Son can be ignorant of nothing, since in Him are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, but He is said to be ignorant of the day of judgment, as St. Thomas well says in the cited place from Contra Gentiles IV, because as man He behaved in the manner of one ignorant, because concerning that day He was silent, or did not reveal it. For he who is silent about something or conceals it, seems with respect to others as if ignorant, or behaving in the manner of one ignorant, while he does not manifest that he knows. And yet the Father is also said to know in this way, because He manifests that day to the Son, even as man. But the Son indeed manifests it to the Holy Spirit, but as God, not as man: for thus He manifests it to no one. But if the angels in heaven knew it, they could know it only by manifesting it to others, because in angels knowledge descends to inferiors from the illumination and influence of superiors. But of this more extensively in Part III, q. 15. To that about the powerlessness to grant the disciples sitting at the right and left, it is answered that the Lord did not say that this distribution did not pertain to His power, but that it did not pertain thus, that is, by reason of carnal proximity, but by due preparation, and disposition of the Father, and consequently His own, because "whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise," and "the Father has given all things into his hands." And therefore He significantly says "grant to you": for "to you" determines the persons asking insofar as they are such, because they were relatives. To those, therefore, for whom it is prepared by the Father, and similarly by Him, to give to them is His own, who will render to each according to his works, and thus those seats at the right and at the left depend on the predestination of God. Without that, "it is not mine," says Christ, to give, nor on account of proximity in flesh and blood, because neither is it the Father's to give thus. But what is said from John 5, that the Son can do nothing by Himself, is said without any prejudice to omnipotence, but only signifies that what the Son works and has, He receives from the Father by generation, not from Himself, for even the essence itself and divinity He does not have from Himself, but receives through generation, not through creation. And thus for the Son to be unable to do anything by Himself, but what He sees the Father doing, does not signify that He does not act by His own, and divine power, which is wholly from itself, that is, uncreated, and not participated from another extraneous, but only that He cannot do things from Himself as an unbegotten person, but as born, and originating from the Father, and consequently as He sees the Father doing. But what is said of the Son hearing, and receiving from the Father, is not said because of the need of the Son, but because of the understanding communicated to Him, because He receives the very understanding of the Father and the very wisdom through generation, and He receives the

same which is in the Father, not another, because it is divine, and cannot be divided. To what is said that the Son is said in Scripture to do all that the Father does, in an instrumental and inferior mode, because the Father is said to do through Him, first we answer that Scripture not only says that creatures are established through the Son, but also that in Him all things hold together, that He with the Father arranges all things, and similarly does as the Father, that He upholds all things by the word of His power, as can be seen in Colossians 1: "In him all things were created, all things were created through him and for him, all things hold together in him"; and in Hebrews 1: "He upholds all things by the word of his power"; and below: "You, Lord, in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth, etc."; Proverbs 8: "I was beside him arranging all things"; John 5: "Whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise." Therefore, it is not said that all things are through Him so dryly and jejunely, as through an instrument, and minister, but as through the principal and consubstantial power with the Father, but derived and received from Him by generation; and therefore it is signified by that preposition "through." Second, it is said from St. Thomas below in q. 36, art. 3, that the preposition "through" denotes a medium, or some order in the procession, or action of a thing. And there can be a medium in power, and authority, or in instrument, and ministry; the power can also be the same, but only the order in supposits or persons. There is order in authority and power, as when it is said that the Bailiff works through the king, or through the authority of the king. On the contrary, however, when it is said that the king works through his Bailiff, "through" signifies ministry and instrument. In the divine, the Father works through the Son as through a person begotten by Him, but with the same power and authority as He, and thus there is order in Persons, not in power and operative potency.

VI. It is argued secondly: Because the passages which we adduce to show the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit or the distinction of Persons, do not compel: therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved, for if any passages especially show the one divinity of the Persons and the distinction among themselves, they are those in John 10: "I and the Father are one"; 1 John, last chapter: "There are three that testify in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one"; Matthew 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." But these passages do not prove. For in the first passage, Christ does not intend to prove a real unity of essence in the Persons, but a moral unity of affection and office, as a prince and minister are one in the operation which is exercised through the minister: as is clear from the proof added by Christ, by which He explained to the Jews, in what sense He had said that He and the Father are one: "If he called them gods to whom the word of God came, do you say of him whom the Father consecrated and sent into the world, 'You are blaspheming,' because I said, 'I am the Son of God'?" Which proof does not compel except to a moral or affective unity of those who are sent by God, and are called one with God, or are called gods, but to infer from this a complete unity in essence, there is no consequence. The second and third passage do not

prove complete unity: for the third only says that they baptize in the name of the Father, etc., where "name" can designate one dignity, not essence. The second says that those three are one, but how they are one, it does not express; but it is gathered that they are not one in substance, because it is added: "And there are three that testify on earth: the Spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three are one"; but these three are not one in substance: therefore neither are the Father and the Word and the Holy Spirit. Hence also the Lord Himself in John 17, praying to the Father, says: "The glory which you have given me I have given to them, that they may be one, even as we are one." But the disciples themselves were not one in essence and reality, but in affection and will: therefore the Father and the Son are one in nothing more.

VII. It is confirmed first, for the part of Sabellius and the ministers of Transylvania, who at this time have introduced Sabellianism through Servetus. For in the Scriptures there is posited a complete unity and solitude of God, which cannot stand, unless there is only one divine Person: for where there is a plurality of Persons, there is simply a multitude and not only unity. But it is said in Deuteronomy 6: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one"; and in ch. 32: "See that I, even I, am he, and there is no god beside me"; Isaiah 45: "I am God, and there is no other"; John 5: "The Father who dwells in me does the works"; and ch. 14: "Whoever has seen me has seen the Father; do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?" Which certainly cannot be verified except because the Father and the Son are the same in themselves, but are diversified only as to connotations and effects. And to the same end they take other authorities, which explain the unity of God, as Paul in 1 Corinthians 8: "Yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things"; and John 17: "That they may know you, the only God"; and other similar ones: for by the very term of unity, the plurality of Persons in God seems to be excluded. The Transylvanians add: Scripture knows no other Christ than one born of the Virgin, who suffered, died, etc., nor do the Apostles and evangelists relate anything of Christ's deeds before the flesh: therefore, there is no Christ who is God from eternity, but that Person of the Father, who is from eternity, is called Christ, when He took flesh in time. Hence also Jesus is said to have been made Lord and Christ by God in time, according to that of Peter in Acts 2: "Let all the house of Israel therefore know for certain that God has made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified"; therefore, there is no Person of Christ which was from eternity: for He who is the eternal God, cannot be made Lord and Christ in time, because He would always have been that naturally. And to the same end serve the authorities adduced above, which say that the true Christ was not only made, but created, and is a creature: for such a person could not be from eternity, but is only so denominated from the connotation of a temporal effect.

VIII. It is confirmed secondly, because the Lord said: "It is more blessed to give than to receive," Acts 20, but the Father gives, and the Son receives, and confesses that it is given to

Him, Matthew 28: "All power in heaven and on earth has been given to me"; and John 5: "He has given him authority to execute judgment"; John 10: "What my Father has given me is greater than all"; therefore the Father is more blessed than the Son. Nor does it matter that He gives to the Son naturally and necessarily, because even in necessary things it is more perfect to give than to receive, as is clear in cause and caused. I omit certain trifles and sophisms of these heretics, such as this: Christ is the Son of the true God: therefore, he who does not have Christ as Son is not the true God, but only the Trinity does not have Christ as true Son: therefore the whole Trinity is not the true God. Again, Christ is the mediator of the true God, but He is only mediator to the Father, and not to the Trinity, hence the prayers of the Church are directed to the Father through Christ: therefore the Father and not the Trinity is the true God. I also omit lies, as when they say that the Ebionites said that the eternal Christ descended into the man Jesus, and they did not make Christ a mere man, and thus they say that we who say that Christ is an eternal Person distinct from the Father are not Ebionites.

IX. To the principal argument, it is answered that the passages adduced by us are most certain, nor do those objected to the contrary obstruct: for to those which are opposed against the first passage, we say that Christ intended to explain two things to the Jews in that passage; one that He is truly God, and consequently of one nature with the Father, not extraneous. And this He gradually introduced, saying first that what the Father had given Him is greater than all (which certainly is nothing but true divinity: for this alone is greater than all things) and then He added, explaining this more: "I and the Father are one": which certainly, if it were not understood of complete unity in the divine nature, would weaken what He had said before, that what was given to Him was greater than all. Hence also the Jews understood Him to have spoken of true divinity, because they said He had blasphemed: "Because you, being a man, make yourself God." The other is to manifest to the Jews that He had not blasphemed, and these words of His did not contain blasphemy. And for this He brought forward the proof alleged in the argument, as if from the lesser to the greater: If the law calls those gods to whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken, nor does it contain blasphemy, a fortiori it will not be blasphemy to call me God who am specially sanctified, and sent by the Father into the world. Hence this proof does not tend directly to proving that He is God, or what He had said that He is one with the Father, but to proving that blasphemy is not contained in those words, but not to diminish and reform what He had said that He is one with God, as if He wanted to be one ministerially, like those to whom the word of God came, not substantially. For that He did not wish to diminish this, is manifestly clear, because having proved that there was no blasphemy in His words, He returns to manifesting that He is the true God in the following words: "If I am not doing the works of my Father, then do not believe me; but if I do them, even though you do not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and understand that the Father is in me and I am in the Father." Which words cannot stand if He were only

God participatively, like a minister, and not substantially, because to be in the Father, and the Father in Him, cannot be verified of any minister. And although through the sacrament Christ says that He is in us, and we in Him, nevertheless He manifestly teaches this to be done through eating, which excludes essential unity. But here He says that the Father is in Him, and He in the Father, because He does the works of the Father, which is to be in Him through the communication of the same power, and thus also of nature.

X. Concerning the second and third passage alleged in the argument, we say they are efficacious. For in that passage: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, etc.," I say that "in the name" does not indicate a bare and empty name, nor accidental dignity, but the supreme and divine, and thus substantial. And concerning that passage: "There are three that testify in heaven, and these three are one," we say it also efficaciously proves this substantial unity, because simply and without any accidental addition it affirms them to be one. Nor does it matter that it is added in similarity to this unity: "And there are three that testify on earth, etc." For this is translated and explained from the Greek by some: "And these three are unto one"; where it is not designated that they are one, as when it is said the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are one. So Fr. Vasquez here disp. 109, ch. 2, num. 132. But nevertheless, since our Vulgate does not put that particle "unto one," but simply "are one," and this Vulgate must be defended, there is no reason why we should recur to that Greek reading. Therefore, the plain sense is that the Spirit, the water, and the blood, which at the time of Christ's passion testified concerning Him, the Spirit indeed when He expired crying out, but the water and blood, because they flowed from His side, these three pertain to composing one human substance in Christ; and similarly the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit pertain to one substance, not indeed composed, because it is divine, but supremely one and simple. But if John speaks there of the sacrament of baptism, the sense will be that the Spirit, water, and blood are one in the notion of sacrament, because they do not express another nature in which they are one; but the Father, Word, and Holy Spirit are also one, not indeed in the notion of sacrament, which has no place there, but in the notion of divinity.

XI. To the first confirmation it is answered that all those passages which affirm one God are not against us, because the three Persons are not three gods, but one God. From the fact, therefore, that one God is affirmed, the distinction of Persons is not taken away, but it is denied that those Persons are many gods. But the passages which affirm that God is alone, are not by exclusion of Persons, which are that same one God, but of other gods, or by exclusion of extraneous nature, and of those things which have it. But when the Father is said to remain in the Son, to be in the Son, to be seen when the Son is seen, and conversely, the unity of person in God is not thereby proved, but only of nature; rather to be, or to remain in the Son or the Son in the Father, is not said congruously of the same Person, but of a distinct one: for no one is said to remain in himself, to be in himself, etc., as St. Thomas

well notes, solving this argument of the Sabellians in Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 9. To what the Transylvanians add, the response is easy: for the Apostles acknowledge Christ from eternity in person, although in time He was made man, as Paul in Hebrews 13: "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever"; and John 10: "In the beginning was the Word." But what He did before the flesh, they manifestly say: "All things were made through him," John 1; "All things were created through him and for him, and all things hold together in him," Colossians 1; "Through whom also he created the world, upholding all things by the word of his power," Hebrews 1. And again there: "You, Lord, in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands." Finally: "Whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise," John 5. But what Peter said that this Jesus was made Lord and Christ by God, we say He was made Lord as man: for even in the human nature He received the name which is above every name, which is named in this age, and in the future, as Paul says. But this was not from eternity, because from eternity He was Lord as God, and that naturally, afterwards as man He was Lord by the benefit of God. The remaining authorities adduced above against the divinity of Christ, we solved there.

XII. To the second confirmation it is answered that it is more blessed to give, than to receive, when what is given is not as much, nor the same as the giver himself, but when what is received is one and the same with the giver himself, it is not less blessed to receive, than to give, because not less is received in him to whom it is given, than is in him who gives: for it identifies in its nature the whole and complete substance of the giver. Hence we rely not only on the fact that naturally and necessarily God gives to the Son His generation, but rather on the fact that this donation communicates all that is on the part of the substance of the giver, and thus he who receives does not remain distinct from the giver, except in the opposition of relation, which is between the giver and receiver, between the proceeding and the producer, but in substance and perfection he does not remain distinct, but the same. Therefore, when something is given through identity with the giver, it is not more blessed to give than to receive: since they remain the same in perfection, but when that which is given is distinct from him who gives, it is more blessed to give than to receive, because then the receiver is in some potentiality and need with respect to the giver. But where there is no need of the receiver, it is not more blessed to give than to receive, as Augustine says in book 3 against Maximinus, ch. 24.

XIII. To those things which are sophistically objected, the response is easy. For the first consequence errs from the non-distributed to the distributed, inferring a negative from an affirmative, as if you say: He who is a grammarian is a true man; therefore he who is not a grammarian, is not a true man: Paul is the son of a true man; therefore he who does not have Paul as son, is not a true man. The second consequence errs in the same way from the non-distributed to the distributed, from an affirmative to a negative. For it stands well that Christ is the mediator of the true God, who is the Father, and yet that another is the true

God, toward whom He is not mediator, as the Holy Spirit. But the truth is, that Christ as man is mediator with respect to the whole Trinity, just as Christ as man was sent by the whole Trinity, and the incarnation was done by the whole Trinity, that satisfaction might be made to the Trinity itself, and Christ might merit grace for us from it. But that prayers are directed to the Father, we say this is because in the Father, as in the first Person the whole Trinity is intended; and yet lest the other Persons remain excluded, the prayers are concluded, saying: "Who lives and reigns with you in the unity of the Holy Spirit." We should not care about the lies of the Transylvanians: for that Ebion said that Jesus was a mere man, is clear from St. Ignatius in the epistle to the Philadelphians; from Irenaeus book 3, ch. 20, and book 1, chs. 25 and 26; from Tertullian in the book on the flesh of Christ, and the book on the prescriptions of heretics, ch. 48; and Augustine in the book on heresies, heresy 10, and others.

XIV. Finally, it is argued from authorities against the divinity of the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is signified to be made, and a creature, as when it is said in Amos 4: "I am the one forming thunder, and creating wind [spirit]"; Joel 2: "I will pour out my Spirit," which pouring out happens only through procession outward; and John 1: "All things were made through him," where "all things" excepts nothing, even the Holy Spirit. Again, He is signified to be less than God, both because He is said to intercede for us, in Romans 8: "The Spirit himself intercedes for us with groanings too deep for words." He is also said to be sent by God, but mission is of servants and ministers, because it happens through the command of the sender, John 15: "The Spirit of truth, whom I will send to you from the Father." Finally, it is confirmed because only the Son proceeds in God through nature; therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed by way of nature, but by free will, and art. But this is proper to a creature.

It is answered that in that passage of Amos, "spirit" is not taken for the Holy Spirit but for the wind, which is also called spirit, as in Exodus 15: "Your wind [spirit] blew, and the sea covered them"; and Psalm 106: "He spoke, and there arose a stormy wind [spirit]"; and Psalm 148: "Wind [spirit] and storms, which do his word." This exposition is from Jerome, Theodoret, Rupert on that passage, and Basil in book 3 against Eunomius. In that passage of Joel, if the outpouring of the spirit is taken for grace and charity, which is diffused in us through the Holy Spirit, it is something created; if for the Person of the Holy Spirit, that outpouring is the same as mission, which is the internal procession of the person with the connotation of a new outward effect, in which that mission is designated, and thus it is suitable for proceeding divine Persons as we will soon say. The passage from John does not compel, because it speaks of every thing that can be made, not of every being, otherwise the Father Himself would also be made and created. To what is objected about the inferiority of the Holy Spirit, we say that He does not intercede formally, but causally, because He makes us intercede. This exposition is given by Augustine in book 1 against

Maximinus not far from the beginning: "Because he himself of whom the Apostle said crying 'Abba, Father,' in another place said 'in whom we cry, Abba, Father,' thus he explained what 'crying' is, by saying 'in whom we cry,' because namely he makes us cry." But that the Holy Spirit is said to be sent, just as the Son, in neither is it speaking of a mission done by command, but mission and procession with some manifestation and visible sign made in time. But such a mission does not obstruct the divinity of the Person sent, because He is not sent where He was not before, but that He may be manifested where before He was not manifested in some new effect. For that the Spirit is not sent where He was not before is clear from Psalm 138: "Where shall I go from your Spirit?" And the Son was sent into the world, where He was before, John 1: "He was in the world, and the world did not know him: he came to his own, etc."

XV. To the confirmation it is answered that to proceed by way of nature says two things, namely to proceed necessarily, or naturally, and to proceed by way of image, and likeness of its principle. Both are together found in the procession of the divine Word; and therefore He is the Son, as will be said below. But in the procession of the Holy Spirit the first is found, namely procession in a natural and necessary way, but not the second, because He proceeds by way of impulse, not image. Nor yet is every procession of the will free, or through art, but also natural and necessary can be given; when it is through love of an object which is the highest good, as in the love of divine fruition.

## THE MULTIPLICATION OF PERSONS INTERNALLY IS NOT REPUGNANT TO THE DIVINE NATURE

XVI. Among the difficulties that arise concerning this mystery (St. Thomas proposes several in Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 10 and resolves them in ch. 14), one is that this mystery, which is attributed to God on account of His supreme eminence and perfection, seems rather to oppose the supreme eminence of divinity. For first, if processions internally are true and real, they must establish some distinction in the substance itself. For the relations themselves, in that very aspect in which they are distinguished among themselves, are still something real; otherwise they would not be really distinguished. Therefore, that real thing in which they are distinguished is not some real accident, for this does not exist in God; it is therefore real substance. How then can we claim that there is no distinction in substance, but only in relation, if the relation itself, even as it is really distinguished from another relation, and in that aspect in which it is distinguished, is substance? Furthermore, these processions in God are real because they occur between really distinct extremes, for this is essential to the notion of a real procession, and these extremes are not really distinct in substance and nature, but only in relation. And again, relations are really distinct because

they are founded upon real processions. Thus, a circle is committed or the principle is begged.

XVII. This is confirmed because, although an intellectual nature by its fecundity and abundance is productive of the Word, nevertheless, when the intellectual nature is pure act and in the ultimate state of all actuality, it is in itself the expressed species, the Word, and the terminus of understanding. Therefore, the production and procession of the Word is repugnant to such a nature, since by itself, in the power and nature of pure act, it is the Word itself and the expressed species. Thus, just as it is not fitting for a man who has formed a word to produce further through contemplation, but to contemplate in the word produced, so it is not fitting for the divine nature to produce the Word, but to contemplate in itself. And if it produces the Word from abundance and fecundity, there appears no reason why the Person of the Word and the Holy Spirit would not produce from the same fecundity that Word, and another, and so on to infinity, which is certainly inappropriate.

XVIII. It is confirmed secondly because it is contradictory to understand procession or production without having being from another, and it is contradictory to understand divine being without it being from itself. How, therefore, can it be understood that a Person is divine and is from another through communication of the divine being itself? And especially because the Word and the Holy Spirit are identically the very essence of God, and necessarily so. When, therefore, we understand the nature or essence in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are already identified there. It is, therefore, not intelligible that they receive that divine being through communication and production, since they have it through supreme identity with the essence. Similarly, production requires that what proceeds is dependent on the producer, is posterior to it, is passing from first act to second, or from non-being to being, because that which is a necessary being, independent, and from itself, is such that it has being when everything else is removed; but that which is a proceeding and produced being from another, does not have being when its producer is removed. Therefore, it is contradictory in a necessary or divine being to understand production or procession.

XIX. It is answered by denying that processions place diversity in the divine substance, but only in respect and relation as opposed, although these opposed relations, which are relatively distinct, have the same essence substantially. And to the objection that even these relations, as opposed and distinct among themselves, are substance, I distinguish: they are substance identically and really in themselves, let it pass; explicitly and formally under the concept of relation, I deny; for under this concept they do not express substance, but order and respect as to another; substance, however, is said to itself. Hence, it implies that relation, which is substance, is distinguished from its correlative or from the relation to which it is opposed in the nature of substance, but in the "to" itself, under the

formality and exercise of "to": for it is distinguished only as to another, but in the nature of substance nothing is expressed except the notion of "to itself." It is therefore contradictory to be distinguished or opposed in substance, although even as it is distinguished and opposed, in reality and identically it is substance. Thus that divine substance, because it is infinite and unlimited, existing entitatively simple in itself, equivalently equals many, and thus contains even the relative genus, and not only the substantial: and one substance gives being to many relations, and constitutes them in its essence and nature, so that what many accidental entities and many "to's" do in created relations, one simple substance, because of its infinity, does in relations which are in God. And because it is of the nature of real relation to be to another, and not to itself, it is necessary that that one substance contain a plurality of relations under the notion of real "to," leaving that they exercise correlative opposition among themselves in the very notion of "to": for the infinite substance encompasses all this, which by this very fact that it gives being to relations, and contains them, must be that in that substance they are one, because being the same and most simple, it embraces in its infinite essence many relations, and that in the notion of "to," in which they are opposed, they remain distinct; nor yet is that "to" fictitious or separated from substance and accident, but it is a real "to" really opposed to another, and really distinct from it, and those realities are not accidents, but the substance itself, yet not many substances, although many relations, because for the reality of relations to be plurified, it suffices to plurify oppositions, and the exercise itself of "to" which in reality is substance, yet the notion itself of substance is not multiplied, because this is not to another; and since it is infinite and not limited and contains diverse things, it also contains the substance and being of another relation; therefore, of both relations there is the same substance, although the reality of the respects and "to" is multiple, because those oppositions are given in reality. But for substance to be divided, it is not sufficient to divide and multiply relations, which are the substance itself in the notion of "to," or as to another, but also in the order to itself, because substance is said to itself, although because of its infinity that substance is also relation, yet not divisible, as substance, but distinguishable, as relation according to the notion of "to." Concerning this, see St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 14, in the solution to the 6th, 7th, and 8th objections, where he explains this at length.

XX. To what is added about the circle and begging the principle in processions and relations, it is answered that divine processions are between really distinct extremes, not which are distinct before the processions themselves, but which are rendered distinct by the processions themselves. Nor is a circle committed by distinguishing processions through relations, and relations through processions, because one proceeds in diverse genera of causes, and thus the vice of circularity ceases: for causes are reciprocally causes; and a demonstration which goes back from the conclusion to the principles, knowing the conclusion through a different medium, does not demonstrate the same through the same, and thus a vicious circle is not made, as we showed in logic, question 25, article 3. In the

present case, relations within God are really distinct because they are relatively opposed among themselves: they are opposed because they are founded in procession and origin, where the immediate cause of distinction is opposition, and the very notion of real relation, which is to another, and not to itself; the remote cause, however, is the procession itself, or origin, and it has this as its foundation. When, on the contrary, it is said that origin and procession is therefore real because it is between distinct extremes, then the total cause is not assigned, nor a cause which is the foundation, but which is the required condition for the procession to be real. For the cause of real procession is that it occurs through real acts and a real principle: it requires, however, as a condition that the extremes be really distinct. Hence, one does not proceed in the same genus of cause nor according to an adequate cause from one to the other, and thus a vicious circle is not committed.

XXI. To the first confirmation, the word or expressed species does two things in us. First, it renders the object understood by way of terminus, just as the impressed species renders it intelligible by way of principle; second, it renders the object spoken and uttered, or speaks and manifests it within itself. And when the object is not in itself of such immateriality and spirituality that it is its own intelligible and understood being, it needs first to be formed in the expressed species, and in it to be spoken or manifested (for that formation is manifestation and speaking) so that from this it is rendered actually understood, and thus because of the need of the object and the intellect, the word is formed, and this is imperfect speaking, when someone speaks in order to understand, because it is supposed that he does not yet understand. But nevertheless, speaking or uttering of itself is not only done because of this need, but even after full understanding, speaking can again be done, not for understanding or better perceiving, but for manifesting and communicating what it understands: for the intellect is naturally communicative and manifestative, because it is light. Hence: "From the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks," as the Lord says, and in Psalm 49 it is said of the divine Word: "My heart has uttered a good word," because just as the mouth erupts when the body is too full, so the mind in God speaks from the supreme fullness, not from any need. Thus, therefore, we say that the divine nature, from the fact that it is pure act, does not produce the Word in the intelligible being itself in order to understand, nor from any need, but from the fullness of understanding; and thus the Father is not wise by the generated wisdom, as Augustine teaches in On the Trinity, book 7, ch. 1. We deny, however, that it is not fitting for intellectual nature so perfect and in pure act to produce a word and speak from the abundance and fullness of understanding: for if intellectual nature is by itself communicative and manifestative of what it understands, and more so the more it understands—for thus it manifests better, like light which is manifestative by itself, the more full and perfect it is—how will that intellectuality, which is supreme in understanding, not be maximally communicative and manifestative, even within itself, and consequently can speak and have a Word. Hence it is said in Isaiah 66: "Shall I, who cause others to bring forth, not bring forth myself, says the Lord? Shall I, who give

generation to others, be sterile, says the Lord your God?" Therefore, the production of the Word is not repugnant to intellectuality which is pure act, not for forming the object in intellectual and immaterial being, but for manifesting and speaking and expressing what it understands: for neither does one who has formed the Word, and contemplates in the formed Word, stop there, but again from perfect understanding and contemplation can speak and manifest to the Word what he understands, because our intellect is by itself always manifestative and locutive. And thus St. Thomas excellently said in this first article that whoever understands, from the fact that he understands, something proceeds within him, as if to say that from the fact that it is of intellectual nature, it ought to be productive of the Word, either from need to form the object and render it understood in act, when by itself it is not thus understood in act; or from abundance and perfection, when speech and production of the word is ordered only to manifesting and speaking, not to forming the object and understanding.

XXII. To what is inquired, why the Word and the Holy Spirit do not produce another Word, since they have the same fecundity, it is answered that this comes from the infinite perfection of these Persons, and from the very notional mode which they have, not from a defect of power and perfection, as St. Thomas teaches below in question 41, article 6. From the perfection indeed of these Persons, because if the Son had another Son, and the Holy Spirit likewise, they would either be one filiation, or distinct and diverse. If diverse, one would not have what the other has; and thus neither would be infinite in its line, and in its genus of filiation. Hence the same reason would apply here for which we do not multiply in God many wisdoms, many immensities, many natures, because if they were multiplied, neither would be supreme, since they are not multiplied from opposition, as now the Father and the Son; for two filiations would not be opposed among themselves. If they are not two filiations, but one, therefore there is one Son. But from the notional mode itself, it is repugnant for the Son and the Holy Spirit to produce another Son or Word, because filiation cannot produce another Son, because the Son as Son does not have another Son, nor does he generate, but is begotten, unless he is also Father. Therefore, for the Son to produce another Son, he would have to be not only Son, but also Father, namely, to have another Son with respect to whom he is Father, because he generates him. Therefore, the Person and notion of Son as purely Son, and nothing other than Son, does not generate. But if it is said that he is also Father, and does not have naked filiation, but also paternity, a greater inconvenience is encountered. Because that paternity which the Son has for generating another Son is either the same paternity as that of the first Person, by whom he is begotten, or a different one. If the same, it cannot be communicated and belong to the Son, because it is opposed to him: for it generated him, and is correlatively related to him: and again if it is the same paternity, it will generate the same Son, not a different one, or the one it has, it did not generate as most perfect and infinite, because another remained to be generated by it. If it is a different paternity from the paternity of the first Person, this

is impossible, both because that paternity and the paternity of the first Person are not opposed relations, nor correlative: therefore, neither diverse, because where opposition does not prevent, all things are one in God, just as active spiration and paternity, because they are not opposed, are one; and also because then the first paternity would not be infinite, because it would not generate all that is generable in God: for it would leave place for another paternity, and another son to be generated, and thus it would not be the supreme and infinite paternity in the notion of father.

XXIII. To the second confirmation it is answered that to have being communicated from another is not repugnant to that which is to have being from itself uncreated, because through these processions is communicated that very being which is in its principle, not something outside God; and thus is not communicated some made being, but that very divine being which is in God: that, however, is not made, but from itself, and thus is communicated being from itself, not from itself, that is, not communicated, but from itself, that is, not made, but that very not-made is communicated through procession internally, not through creation externally.

To what is said that these Persons are identified with the essence, and thus do not have divine being through procession, if they have it through identity, it is answered that these Persons are identified with the essence, not in any way whatsoever, but as proceeding, and simultaneously with the procession itself, since indeed for such a Person to be proceeding is the characteristic mark of it by which it is recognized and distinguished from another non-proceeding, or not thus proceeding, and without which procession real relation cannot be multiplied in God, as will be said later. Hence it is repugnant that the relation of the Son be identified with the essence, unless as proceeding from the Father. Such communication and procession, therefore, are not repugnant with identification, nor is it inappropriate for filiation to be identified with the essence, because it is not opposed to it, and to have this essence with which it is identified through procession and communication, because it is the relation of one proceeding, and thus has identification as proceeding. Hence in that sign in which we understand the essence in the Father, we understand in that essence the Person of the Son and the Holy Spirit identified, I distinguish: if in that sign we also understand the Son and the Holy Spirit as proceeding, I concede; if we do not yet understand them as proceeding, I deny, because if we do not understand them as proceeding, we do not understand them as Son and Holy Spirit. But if already in that sign we understand the Son to be identified as proceeding, and not absolutely: therefore to have essence through identification and communication are not contrary, if that which is identified, is identified as proceeding and communicating, and not in another way.

XXIV. As to what is said that what is produced must be posterior to its producer, dependent on it, and passing from first act to second act, I say these conditions belong to imperfect

production, and through which distinct and diverse being is received from its producer. But where procession is for having and communicating that very being which is in its principle from which it proceeds, and with which the one proceeding is identified, these conditions do not intervene there. And thus there is not there a transition from first act to second act, but it is the same second act, and pure act, which is communicated there, without dependence or priority of duration or nature, because it is the same being in the proceeding thing itself, and the principle from which it proceeds. But the proceeding relation itself, since it does not have being distinct from the essence, because it is not opposed to it, with its correlative to which it is opposed, and from which it proceeds, has simultaneity, because relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore from no part is priority founded in these processions, but only the order of origin with total simultaneity, indeed identity in essence; simultaneity, however, in relations as they are correlative.

XXV. Second, repugnance can be shown on the part of the divine nature to these processions and plurality of Persons from certain conditions required for true procession and plurality of Persons, which are repugnant to God, e.g., because generation is mutation, and any production is a certain mutation, but mutability is repugnant to the divine nature. Also, the same nature numerically cannot be communicated by the Father to another supposit, nor can it be received or placed in it, because if the first happens through transfusion of nature into another supposit, it will cease to be in the Father; if through exuberance or extension into another, we posit divisibility, or parts and increase in the divine essence. The second, however, is repugnant to the proceeding supposit itself, because thus it would be in potency to the nature which it would receive, and would be distinguished from it, because nothing receives itself. Also, if many Persons are one God, that one God is subsisting by reason of his deity, since it is the most perfect form, not incomplete or inherent: but a subsisting intellectual form is a person; therefore the Father and the Son agree not only in one nature, but in one person, and there will be four persons in God, which is heretical.

XXVI. This is confirmed because in two correlatives is found dependence of one relative on its correlative, as on a terminus; there is also found diversity of predicates, which require diverse essence: for the Father is God unbegotten and generating, the Son is God begotten and not generating, paternity is incommunicable, essence communicable: therefore the Son and the Father cannot be one God, nor essence and Person one thing. For these relations cannot be in God unless they are something divine and the divine essence itself. But the divine essence is common to the Father and the Son: therefore if the relation itself is the divine essence, the relation will be common, like the essence, or if it is not common, and yet in that in which it is not common, it is something, it will be a thing which is not the divine essence. And granted that in the notion of opposed relation they are diverse relations, and diverse things, nevertheless these relations must be founded in something

absolute, and that absolute is either one or diverse. If diverse, the divine essence will be divided; if one, it cannot found many and opposed relations, because the diversity of relations is taken from the foundations.

It is answered that all these arguments are solved by St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 14: from his doctrine it is not difficult to answer them.

XXVII. To the first, therefore, about mutation, we say that generation is mutation when it proceeds from potency to act, which is imperfect generation, and as it is found in creatures. But it is not transferred to God, but with imperfections removed, and only as to the notion of procession of the living from the living in likeness of nature, without any potentiality, but passing from second act to second act, because it is God from God, and light from light, just as also wisdom and justice are posited in God, not by way of quality and accident, as they are in us, but with these imperfections removed.

To the second part of the argument it is said that the Father does not communicate to the Son a part of nature, because divinity does not have parts, but is a most simple entity, but communicates His whole nature. Nor yet does He cease to be in the Father, because He is not communicated to the Son as to a supposit or foreign person, but one which is the same with the divine essence itself. And thus, since the divine essence, because of its infinite eminence, identifies all relations and Persons in itself in the way in which they are in itself, namely as proceeding, because without procession they cannot be distinct, the communication of nature, which the Father gives to the Son proceeding, does not take away from the Father the nature which He communicates to the Son, but it remains in Him. That nature thus communicated is not received in the Son, because it is not compared to him as form to matter, or act to potency, but as pure act containing all perfection, of which one is that real relation as opposed to its correlative, and proceeding from it, and identified with the divine nature itself, not receiving it, because if it were receivable, it would not be pure act.

To the third part of the argument it is said that the divine essence in itself is also a subsistent thing, but not a Person, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 14, in the solution to the fifth reason, and as we will say below. Because a person is not whatever subsists in intellectual nature, but what subsists incommunicably with respect to a further term. But the divine nature is communicated to a further term, namely Persons, or relations, and for this part it is not a person. But it is subsistent, because it has being per se, nor does it have the mode of an incomplete, inherent, or informing form, or one dependent on another in its being, but in itself it is full and perfect being, and exists per se, not through Persons, and this suffices for it to be called subsistent, namely, existing per se, although not in the manner of an incommunicable person. And thus there are not four Persons in God.

To the confirmation it is answered that relation in God is not dependent either as to being, because its being is the substance of God itself, not coming to it; or as to the exercise of respect and the notion of "to," because "to" as "to," or relation as respecting, does not have being from the terminus, because rather it is relatively opposed to it; nor is it caused by it, because rather relatives are simultaneous in nature, not one prior to the other: but if one depended on the other, it would be posterior to it in that in which it depends. Therefore, relation has with its terminus connection and correspondence, not dependence, just as also essence has connection with its proper passions, not dependence on them, because for dependence is required connection with potentiality and imperfection of having something from another as needing it for its being, and inferior to it.

To the other part of the argument it is answered that that diversity of predicates does not demand diverse essence, but diverse relation, because that opposition of predicates is relative. And thus God generating and God begotten are the same God essentially, not the same personally, namely as to that in which generating and begotten are relatively opposed, not as to what they are in nature. And the same thing, which is essence, is communicable as to nature, is incommunicable as to relation because of the eminence of the divine essence itself, which, since it is infinite, existing one in itself, contains all genera of perfections or notions not repugnant to it. And thus it contains the relative genus, which of itself expresses incommunicability to its correlative, to which it is opposed. Therefore, by this very fact that the divine essence admits relations in itself, it ought under some consideration to admit incommunicability, and under another communicability, but the divine substance, existing one, does this, because because of its infinity it fulfills the roles of many, which among us exist.

And to the objection that if relation, or person is essence, and essence is common, person will be common, the consequence is denied, because "what" is changed into "to something," and it is reduced to a defect of appellation. For since the divine essence, although it is simple, yet because of its eminence is equivalently many, it is the same for consequences to proceed from the formality of the relative to the absolute, or conversely, as if they were many in reality formally, because in consequences reality is not attended to, but formality. Therefore, that one thing, which is the divine essence, is both common under the consideration of essence, and not common under the formality of person, although nature and person are one most simple thing in the being of the thing. And when it is said that that relation, even insofar as not common, is something, I answer that it is the very thing which is the divine essence, not a thing outside the divine essence; but that thing, which is the divine essence, is not only a common or communicable thing, but also a thing which is incommunicable, that is, relation, because by its infinity it embraces all this, both the absolute genus, according to which perfections it is common to the three Persons, and the relative genus, according to which that same thing which is essence, is not common, but

opposed to the correlative: for the relative genus requires this from its essential notion, which is necessarily to another opposed to itself, and distinct from itself. And yet all those relations are one in being and substance, because one infinite substance is sufficient to give being to many relations, which it contains in its eminence.

And to what is said about the foundation, it is answered that those relations have an absolute foundation which is one entitatively, namely the divine essence itself according to the operations of understanding and willing, which are in reality, but eminently many, so that from its fecundity it can found many relations according to diverse processions and origins. Which cannot be in creatures, because one essence cannot be eminently infinite, and contain these diverse foundations. And yet we see that one thing materially one founds diverse relations, as the same quantity founds the notion of equal, the relation of similar to another quantity of the same species, the relation of measure, or the measured to those things which are measured by such quantity, or measure it.

## THE MYSTERY DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LIGHT

XXVIII. From the third point mentioned above, an objection is raised against this mystery, because its assertion destroys principles evident by natural light itself, which cannot stand: for thus faith would attempt to introduce something contradictory. For God, who is the author of nature and has given us natural principles, does not destroy them through the mystery of His divinity. But the assertion of this mystery primarily destroys the principle that two contradictories cannot be verified of the same thing simultaneously. Yet in this mystery they are verified, because the same utterly simple thing admits contradictory predicates, e.g., that the same thing which is essence is both communicable and incommunicable, is the unbegotten principle which is the Father, is the begotten which is the Son.

Nor is it sufficiently answered through the infinite eminence of the divine essence, because no eminence, however infinite, can verify two contradictories of the same thing in reality, because by their very terms two contradictories simultaneously repugn in whatever nature; for what affirmation posits, negation removes. Nor is it sufficient to verify two contradictories of the same thing under diverse formalities and considerations, because negation that falls on something in reality does not fall under our formality and consideration, but absolutely; and thus it removes absolutely what affirmation posits.

The second principle known by natural light which this mystery destroys is: Whatever things are identical with a third thing are identical with each other, upon which the entire

syllogistic structure of logic is founded, and all the strength of inference and consequence. But this principle is denied in this mystery, because the three Persons are one and the same in the divine essence, yet they differ among themselves and are not one.

The third principle is: By the same entity by which something is constituted, it differs from others. This principle is destroyed in this mystery, because paternity is constituted by the divine essence, since it has no other reality and entity than the divine, and is within God, and differs really from filiation, yet it does not differ from it by the divine essence, because in this it agrees with the Father. What then is that reality in which it differs from another Person, if it is not the divine essence, or divine entity? Because in this they agree, yet it cannot be a created entity, because nothing created can exist within God.

The fourth principle known by natural light is that: Where there is order of procession and origin of one from another, there cannot be simultaneity of nature, although there can be simultaneity in duration and time. For if they are simultaneous in nature, there is no greater reason why this one proceeds from that one, rather than conversely; however, in time they can be simultaneous, because in instantaneous production the cause and effect can be simultaneous. But in this mystery, the Father and the Son are simultaneous, not only in duration, but also in nature: for they have the same nature, and yet the Son is said to proceed from the Father. If therefore they are simultaneous in nature, why would we say that the Person of the Father produces the Person of the Son, rather than the contrary? Is it because this one is the Son, and that one the Father? But the difficulty is about this, why is this one the Son rather than the Father, since both Persons are simultaneously and by identity the same essence, and of the same power and potency? And thus there is no greater reason on the part of nature and power why one produces rather than is produced. But the diverse relation, of Father in one, of Son in the other, cannot be understood unless antecedently to the relation there is some diversity in one Person that is not in the other, so that it can found that diverse relation. But besides relations, nothing diverse is found in one that is not in the other, because besides relations, whatever remains is absolute perfection, and everything absolute is one and the same in all Persons.

And from this arises the fifth principle that is destroyed: Because no thing produces its own being, or communicates it through procession, but if it produces, it produces a being diverse from itself. But in this mystery the Father produces the Son, and the Son through procession from the Father has being, and yet that being which he has is not produced being, but is that very being which the Father has, namely the divine, and the Son is said to be begotten, and yet the being which he has is not begotten, but is the divine essence itself. And the reality of that relation in the notion of relation and respect is divided and multiplied, because they are three things, yet the truths, goodnesses, and the very being of such relations are not multiplied. How can these things stand without manifest

contradiction? And how can it be understood that the realities of relations in the notion of thing, or in the notion of being, are multiplied, because they are three things, and not in the notion of such being, namely substance, or accident, good, and true, so that there are three truths or goodnesses? Since indeed, when the superior grade is multiplied, the inferior differences are multiplied, and the properties of the superior grade, just as are the transcendental properties with respect to being, such as true and good.

The sixth principle is that: A relation cannot be understood before its foundation. This principle is known by natural light, because relation has being from its foundation: if, therefore, it were before its foundation, it would be before it existed. This principle is destroyed in this mystery. For paternity is a relation founded on active generation: therefore such a relation does not exist before generation. And again, the relation of the Father precedes generation, because the Person of the Father is constituted by the relative, not by the absolute: for it is constituted by that by which it is opposed to the Son: but it is not opposed to the Son except according to the relation of Father: therefore, that Person of the Father is before generation, and thus the relation is before its foundation. These are almost all the principles which, known from the light of nature, cause difficulty in this mystery. Yet from their solution, the defense which theology makes concerning this sublime and elevated mystery will appear clearer.

XXIX. To the first, it is answered that the natural principle that two contradictories cannot be verified of the same thing, remains unharmed in this mystery: because "of the same thing" is understood most formally insofar as it is the same. Now, however, that thing which is the divine essence having in itself the perfections of many things, or genera, although it is one and the same, nevertheless is not communicable and incommunicable according to the same aspect: for if according to the notion of nature and absolute perfection it were communicable and incommunicable, there would be a contradiction; but that it is communicable according to the notion of nature, and incommunicable according to the notion of person and relation, there is no contradiction. And thus St. Thomas says below in question 39, article 1, reply to objection 2, that: "Insofar as essence and Person in the divine differ according to the notion of understanding, it follows that something can be affirmed of one which is denied of the other." Contradiction, therefore, is the affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing insofar as it is the same, or according to the same aspect. But where different formalities can be considered, and distinguished according to reason, although in reality they are one, contradictory predicates can be verified there; just as in the same species, the specific or differential grade, and the generic grade in reality are one entity, and are only virtually distinguished, but actually by the intellect, and yet of that entity, according to the generic notion, something is said which is not according to the specific grade, or conversely, just as man, insofar as rational, reasons and understands, not insofar as animal. Thus, therefore, the same entity of the divine

essence as relative is not communicated, as absolute it is communicated, nor is there a contradiction, because speaking most formally, they are not of the same thing of the same thing, because not according to the same aspect. But whether the same can be said of the absolute attributes, that by reason of this virtual distinction something is said of one and not of another, I say that in the formal sense it can be said, not in the identical sense, just as we say that God generates through the intellect, not through the will, He does not punish through mercy, but through justice. Identically, however, He does the same through both.

XXX. To the first objection against this, it is said that no eminence can make contradictories be verified, if they are always made under the same notion, so that they are formally of the same thing of the same thing. And thus if absolutely, and even in the identical sense, it is said the thing which is essence is communicable, the thing which is essence is not communicable, they are contradictory, and the second is false, because that negation makes the sense that in no way is the essence communicable, which is false: for in some way, namely as absolute, it is communicable. But that divine eminence provides this, that although it is a unique most simple thing, nevertheless it is virtually multiple, and performs the function of several genera, or perfections. And thus under distinct formalities conceiving that thing, something can be affirmed and denied without contradiction, which would not be so if that entity did not have such eminence and virtual multiplicity, because thus they are not formally of the same thing of the same thing.

To the other objection it is said that those formalities under which affirmation and negation are made are also found in the thing itself, although not actually distinct in reality, but virtually, and by the intellect actually. But nevertheless, negation which is applied to a thing need not be applied according to every notion found in such a thing, but sometimes can be applied to the whole thing absolutely, and denying the whole under every respect, sometimes under the respect of some formality only, and not of another, and under precision, because since affirmation and negation are formed in the intellect, where those formalities are distinguished formally, which in reality are one, it can under diverse precision and appellation moderate that negation, and in reality correspond to it, not the whole thing absolutely, but that thing, insofar as it exercises one formality and function, not as it exercises another, although it is one thing entitatively, which exercises all those functions. Hence negation can be applied to the thing itself, not however absolutely, but under some consideration and respect, insofar as they found a virtual distinction of one notion from another. And thus affirmation and negation are not of the same thing of the same thing formally, and according to the same aspect, although in reality entitatively the whole is the same, but virtually and fundamentally multiple because of eminence, and negation is not applied under every notion which is in the thing.

XXXI. To the second, it is answered from St. Thomas below in question 28, article 3, reply to objection 1, that that principle: "Whatever things are identical with a third thing, etc.," is understood by the philosopher in Physics, text 21, concerning those things which are identical with a third thing, in reality and in notion, but not concerning those things which differ in notion. The same principle is explained differently by the holy doctor in I, distinction 33, question 1, article 1, reply to objection 2, that it is understood: "Those things which are identical with a third thing are identical with each other, in the way in which they are identical with that third thing, and not otherwise, nor in another way." And thus the three Persons are identical with a third thing, namely the divine substance, in the notion of the absolute, and among themselves they are also one in the same absolute and substantial notion, yet they are not one among themselves relatively, because neither in that third thing are they one relatively, but only absolutely. Therefore, this mystery preserves that natural principle, that: "Those things which are identical with a third thing are identical with each other," namely in the way in which they are identical with a third thing; but in another way, it is not necessary that they be identical with each other, but only in that way in which they are one in that third thing.

Others explain that principle thus: "Those things which are identical with a third thing are identical with each other," if they are identical with a third thing adequately and simply, but not if they are identical with a third thing inadequately. But the divine relations are inadequately related to the essence, because each of them so affects the essence that it leaves room for another; and thus all three Persons are adequate to it, not just one. This explanation almost coincides with the prior explanation of St. Thomas.

Others say that that principle is to be understood thus, that: "Those things which are identical with a third thing are identical with each other," unless some opposition stands in the way between those extremes, so that they are one among themselves more than that unity by which they are the same in one third thing. Finally, Fr. Suarez in book 4 on the Trinity, chapter 3, denies that that principle is true, except in created things because of their limitation, but false if extended to divine things, because of their infinity, in which there is room both for absolute perfection, in which all things are one, and for the relative between which there is opposition. Which Fr. Vasquez also teaches in the second volume, in the first part, disputation 123, chapter 2, and others, who teach that that principle holds only where there is limited power, not where there is infinite eminence encompassing the absolute genus with the highest unity, and the relative with correlative opposition. From all of which it is clear how that natural principle is not destroyed in this mystery, but remains unharmed, understanding it in its truth and legitimate sense.

XXXII. It should only be noted that in that first explanation of St. Thomas, when he says from the philosopher that those things which are identical with a third thing are identical

with each other, if they are identical in reality and in notion, it seems to suffer an objection, both because otherwise syllogisms could only be made syllogisms in synonymous terms, and in those things which are one, such that they differ neither in reality nor in notion, which is against the common use of syllogizing: for syllogisms are also made in terms which are distinguished by reason, as if you say:

Every man is an animal,
Every animal is sensible,
Therefore every man is sensible.

And yet "man" and "animal" differ in notion: therefore it is not necessary for some things to be identical with each other that they are identical in a third thing, in reality and in notion; and also because the divine attributes differ in notion, from the essence, and among themselves, and yet they are identical in the essence and among themselves: therefore it is not required, for them to be identical with each other, that they are identical with a third thing in reality and in notion. And St. Thomas himself in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 9, concludes that power and action in God are identical, because: "Those things which are identical with a third thing are identical with each other," and yet they differ in notion from the essence, and are not identical with it, in reality and in notion.

It is answered by conceding all these instances, but we say they are not against St. Thomas, because when he says that whatever things are identical with one and the same thing are identical with each other in those things which are identical, in reality and in notion, "in reality and in notion" is not to be construed with "are," but with that third thing in which they are identical; so that when that third thing is one and the same according to reality, and according to notion, that is, according to formality, but is not virtually multiple, then from identity with such a third thing, follows the identity of them with each other: but if they are identified with something having diverse formalities, and notions, or respects, one is identified under one respect and formality, another under another, it does not follow from such identification with that third thing, the identity of them with each other; rather from this arise many paralogisms, and defects of variation of appellation, because from identity under some respect, and not simply and absolutely, identity with each other simply is inferred, just as this is not valid: "Similarity is identical with quality: quality is intense: therefore similarity is intense." "Action and passion are identical with motion: the action of those crucifying Christ was most evil: therefore the passion of Christ was most evil." And similarly this is not valid: "The Father and the Son are identical in essence; therefore they are identical with each other," because the essence is virtually multiple, and under the notion of absolute they are identical, under the relative they are opposed: and thus if the relations are identical with the absolute essence, they are identical with each other according to absolute entity, in which they do not differ among themselves, not according

to relative correlation. Therefore, it is necessary that those things which are identical with a third thing be identified with it simply, and under the same notion, not under diverse ones, in order to be identified with each other; but it is not necessary that they be so identified that they do not differ even through the intellect, and are altogether synonymous: for this St. Thomas never dreamed of, nor is it required for the verification of that principle, as is clear from the instances brought forward. But the example which St. Thomas adduces of those things which are identical with a third thing, in reality and in notion, like tunic and garment, which was an example brought by the philosopher, was not adduced for this purpose that only those things which are identical in notion, like two synonyms, which are distinguished only by reasoning reason, are identical with each other, but for this purpose that those things which are identical, in reality and in notion with a third thing, that is, in a third thing, which is one according to reality, and according to notion, that is, according to the same formality, and not according to virtual multiplicity, which multiplicity tunic and garment do not have, and for this they are adduced by the philosopher (for the example is his in Physics, text 21) and by St. Thomas, although among themselves they are synonyms, and are distinguished only by reasoning reason, and they are not adduced by St. Thomas for this purpose.

XXXIII. To the third, it is answered that that principle also remains unharmed in this mystery. For paternity is constituted by the divine essence, not under the absolute concept, but the relative, and by the same under the relative concept it also differs from filiation. But by the divine essence under the absolute concept it agrees with the Son, nor is it distinguished from it, but nevertheless in the notion of paternity and person it is not constituted by the divine essence under that absolute concept, but under that relative one: but in the notion of divine being and substance it is constituted by the divine essence as absolute, but in this it does not differ from the Son. And when it is asked, what is that reality in which it differs from the Son, created or divine, I say it is divine, not under the absolute concept, but the relative, for in essence the Father and the Son do not agree under that relative concept, but under the absolute; but under the relative they are opposed, and thus are distinguished. But the divine essence, because of its infinite eminence, embraces both genera, both the absolute and the relative.

XXXIV. To the fourth, it is answered that that principle is understood of origin and procession of a different nature, or absolute entity, from that which is in its principle. But when that which proceeds, and the principle from which it proceeds are only diverse relations having the same nature, that principle does not hold, but between those two there can be given simultaneity of nature, with order of origin, because relatives, insofar as relatives, are simultaneous in nature, not only relatives which are founded in unity and agreement, like similarity and equality, but also those which are founded in origin and action, like paternity and filiation: for these relatives even in created things insofar as such,

are simultaneous in nature, and yet are founded in origin, because the Son proceeds from the Father. And such relations if they were subsisting persons, one would proceed from another, and yet in the notion of relatives and correlations they would be simultaneous in nature. And when it is objected that if they are simultaneous in nature, there is no greater reason why this one proceeds from that one, rather than conversely, I say that there is a greater reason by reason of the foundation of such relations, because although insofar as they are relative they are simultaneous in nature, because nevertheless they are relations founded in origin and procession of one from another, it is necessary that one be related as principle and the other as proceeding, one originating and the other originated, because such relations are from themselves, and from their foundation. And when it is said that this is the difficulty, why is this one the Son rather than the Father, since both relations are identified in essence, and of the same power and potency, I respond that both are identified, not in just any way, but with procession and origin, which is their foundation, for a relation is not identified except as founded. But origin and procession itself demands that one be identified as principle, and the other as from the principle, and that one be paternity, this filiation. And thus they have the same power and absolute potency, but not the same notionally, or as to relative and personal modification, which is absolutely required for one to be proceeding, or from another, and the other to be principle, and that from which another is. In the Father, therefore, or in the relation which is principle, is found power, as fecund for originating from itself another person. But in the Son is found the same power, as the basis of being born, and expressing its principle; and thus it is the same power under diverse modification and notion. And thus is understood diversity in relation according to itself formally, but antecedently to relations, this diversity is understood fundamentally in the foundations themselves of relations which are active or passive origins, not the essence itself precisely under the absolute concept: for thus it is common to all Persons, not the special foundation of each, nor under the concept formally and explicitly relative, but under the concept of founding relations, that is, under the concept of origins: for thus just as it is fundamentally relation, it is fundamentally opposition and distinction, because distinction is through relations.

XXXV. To the fifth, it is answered that that principle, "no thing produces its own being," remains most certain, nor is it broken by this mystery; for the Father does not produce His absolute being, because this is unproducible, although it is communicable to another Person; nor does He produce His relative being, that is, His relation, both because He does not produce paternity which is His relation; and because the being of relations, or Persons, more probably is one, namely the absolute being itself, by which the essence exists as being from itself, and pure act. But this absolute being through procession, is communicable to the proceeding Person: for the proceeding Person is identified with that being, not in just any way, but as a Person which is from another: it is necessary, therefore, that that very being be communicated to itself, to which through procession, and under the notion of

proceeding it is identified; and thus God is said to be begotten in the concrete by reason of the generated supposit, although the essence is not said to be begotten, nor the absolute being itself, because otherwise divinity would be distinguished in the very notion of nature, or divinity from its generator, whereas nature is not opposed to anyone within God, and thus is distinguished from no one, but is common to all.

To what is said that the realities of relations are multiplied, without multiplying the perfections of truth, goodness, and existence, etc., it is answered that this is not contradictory, as we will say more extensively below, because all absolute perfections, whether they are transcendental or not, cannot be multiplied, just like the essence itself which is absolute, although these perfections themselves belong to the relations themselves, but indivisibly, and consubstantially, as one. But as to what is said that the superior grade cannot be multiplied, e.g., that there are three things, and not the inferior differences, and properties, I say that the inferior differences are multiplied, or properties, which also belong by reason of relative opposition itself; and thus are multiplied three things, or three realities, or entities, and some grade inferior to the notion of being is multiplied, namely the concept of relation: for this is inferior to the concept of being and thing, and thus something inferior to being is multiplied. And the relations themselves are multiplied through diverse species, or quasi-species, as that one is paternity, another filiation, another spiration, and similarly they are multiplied in the individual, namely that it is this paternity, this filiation, etc. Wherefore we posit multiplication not only in the superior grade of being, or thing, but also in the inferior, but in that only which can express relative opposition. But why can the inferior grade not be multiplied under the notion of substance and accident? The reason is at hand, because these notions, or concepts do not express relative opposition, or the notion of "to," but that which holds itself on the part of "in," or on the part of being itself, and essence as it exists absolutely. And indeed the notion of accident cannot be multiplied here, because accident has no place in God. But the notion of substance is manifestly said to itself, and does not express opposition, and "to": for it is subordinated to being as existing per se, and according to that which is of actuality, and perfection, and this is not multiplied. And similarly transcendent properties, which follow upon being under the notion of some perfection, like goodness, which follows upon the fullness and perfection of being, and truth or knowability, which follows upon the immateriality of the thing, and connection of predicates, these are not multiplied, because they do not express relative opposition, nor do they follow upon it.

XXXVI. To the sixth, more will be said around question 40, in treating of the constitutive of the Persons, and especially of the Person of the Father. We say therefore that that proposition: "Relation cannot be understood before its foundation," is also verified in this mystery, but in a completely formal sense, namely relation as respecting, or as exercising the notion of "to," not according to other considerations, e.g., relation as subsisting, or

existing per se: for this is not of the concept of relation according to itself, nor for relation to be subsisting does it need a foundation, but identification with the divine nature. For foundation is required in relation for two things. First, and per se for the very exercise of respecting, and tending to another: for this a foundation is necessary by which some subject is proportioned and coordinated in such or such a way toward another. Second, when relation is an accident, because it has in the genus of accident the weakest and most imperfect being, whence it needs not only a subject, but also a foundation from which to have being, because it does not have it only through order to the subject, like the rest of absolute accidents, but also in order to the terminus, and thus it needs some foundation besides the subject, concerning which St. Thomas can be seen in Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 14, in reply to the 9th reason. Thus therefore in the divine the relation of the Father as to the exercise of relation, by which it respects and touches its terminus, which is the Son, is not understood before its foundation, which is active generation: because He generates, He respects, and thus the relation of the Father, as respecting, or in the exercise of respecting is not before its foundation. But relation not as respecting and touching the terminus, but as subsisting, and affecting the subject, it is not inconvenient that it precede the foundation, which is generation, because for subsisting it does not need a foundation, but for respecting: for He does not subsist because He generates, but He generates because He subsists, and is the Person of the Father. Although relation is nothing other than respect to the terminus, nevertheless because it also affects the subject, and in created things has inherence, in divine things subsistence, it can be considered not only as respecting, but also as in itself, and on the part of the subject. Concerning which we will say more extensively in the place cited.

## THE FUTILE SOPHISMS OF HERETICS

XXXVII. Valentinus Gentilis and the Transylvanian ministers have raised many objections, which Bellarmine presents and refutes extensively in Volume I, Book II on Christ, from chapter 7 onwards. But almost all their force is clear from the discussion above. For they object that this mystery destroys natural principles such as: "Whatever things are identical with a third thing are identical with each other"; "Everything either is or is not": for paternity is essence, and is not essence, because it is not filiation, whereas filiation is essence. All this has already been solved above. Paternity is essence, or God under the absolute concept and the relative concept of paternity, not under the concept opposed to it and correlative, which is the Son and the Holy Spirit, and thus the negative statement that it is not essence, speaking absolutely, is false, as is there denied absolutely, although it is not filiation, which is essence under the concept opposed to it and correlative. Nor is it inappropriate that the same essence and substance, because of its eminence and infinity, contains the relative genus and gives its being to many opposed relations, because the

genus of relation necessarily requires a correlative as other and distinct; and thus it is the same to find the relative genus in the divine essence, and to find the correlative, and thus opposition and distinction with complete unity in the absolute. That this relative genus must be admitted in God is clear because Scripture teaches that in God there is the Father and the Son, which are relative, and because in admitting this genus no imperfection is found, provided that relation is not an accident.

XXXVIII. Secondly, they object to the same, because something belongs to one Person which does not belong to another: for one generates, another does not; one is generated or proceeds, another does not: therefore they cannot be one and the same substance. Again, understanding and willing are exactly the same in God: therefore those proceeding through intellect and will are also the same, and not diverse Persons. Again, any Person is infinite in the nature and line of person: therefore it is one: for just as from the infinity of essence follows unity, because if it were divided, neither divided part would be infinite, because one would have something which the other did not, so from the infinity of Person must follow its unity, otherwise one would have something which another did not, and thus neither would be infinite. Again, either Person in the divine expresses perfection, or not. If not, why is it in God: for the human Person, which expresses perfection, will be of better condition than the divine. But if it expresses perfection: therefore some perfection is in one Person which is not in another: therefore perfections are multiplied in the divine.

To the first sophism, it is answered by distinguishing the major premise; something belongs to one Person which does not belong to another, something notional and relative under the respect and notion of the relative, I concede; something absolute and perfect under the concept of perfection and essence, I deny: therefore they are not one substance, I deny the consequence: for the same substance because of its eminence both has one absolute notion and the opposite relative, and in the nature of the opposite is multiplied.

To the second, it is conceded that those proceeding through willing and understanding are one in essence and substance, in which also understanding and willing are one, but they are not one relatively and notionally, namely insofar as they are relatively opposed.

To the third, each Person is infinite: and thus does not multiply the perfection of Person, but only relative opposition. And each Person is infinite in the being of Person, and thus multiplies infinity, just as each person is God, yet does not multiply deity. Therefore, just as from the infinity of essence follows absolute unity, so from the infinity of Person follows unity as regards the perfection of Person, but opposition remains in respect and opposition, which essence according to itself does not have; and thus in the notion of opposed respect it is multiplied, without multiplying infinity and the perfection of Person in the notion of perfection, because relation on the part of perfection, and in "in," is not opposed, nor divided from another relation, but only as it expresses "to," and under this

notion that reality as relative is multiplied, not its perfection under the concept of perfection, in which opposition is not exercised, but under the concept of respect in which there is opposition.

To the fourth, we will speak below when treating whether relations express relative perfection in their concept, and multiply it, just as thing is multiplied. Now we say that relation expresses perfection, but on the part of "in"; on the part of "to," however, it does not explain it, although it has it there, because in order to another it does not explain what it is, but against what it is, and purely respects, or tends to another, it does not express perfection, although it has it in itself. But relations are not multiplied in God according to the notion of "in," according to which they are not opposed, but according to the notion of "to," although that "to" is real, but as it touches another, it is only opposed, not perfect, and thus they have perfection: but not distinct and diverse, because neither is it opposed insofar as it is perfection. Of which more will be said below.

XXXIX. They object thirdly: He who does not generate, nor is begotten, nor proceeds, is not the true God; the divine essence neither generates, nor is begotten, nor proceeds: therefore that which is called one God in essence is not the true God: but the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the true God: therefore they are not one God in essence. The minor premise of the first syllogism is clear from the common way of speaking of theologians, taken from the Lateran Council, second canon, that essence neither generates nor is generated, otherwise there would be two essences. The major is proved, because there is no God besides the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but the Father begets, the Son is begotten, the Holy Spirit proceeds: therefore he who does not beget, nor is begotten, nor proceeds, is not the true God. Again, because the divine essence, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are four names which are not synonymous: therefore to them correspond four distinct things: for essence is a thing, and is not the Father, because it does not beget, nor the Son, because it is not begotten, nor the Holy Spirit because it does not proceed; therefore they are four things, and thus there is a quaternity not a Trinity. And especially when essence is related as the source and root of the Persons, or relations, and their foundation, but the root and source is distinguished from what emanates. Again, the unbegotten and the begotten differ, like the generable and the ingenerable, which differ more than in genus, and thus the Father and the Son will differ more than in genus; how therefore are they one God? Especially because if they are one God, that God will be begotten in the Son, and not begotten in the Father, which is a contradiction, begotten and not begotten. And being begotten itself, and unbegotten, is either accident or substance. If substance, they differ substantially, and thus are not one substance. If accident, this is repugnant to God: for He would be composed of accident and substance.

XL. To the first sophism, it is answered that the minor is certain, that essence does not generate, nor is generated, as is clear from the Lateran Council, second canon: "We condemn," on the most high Trinity, although the Father who generates is essence, and the Son who is begotten is essence, yet essence does not generate, but that thing which is essence; for the fallacy of accident occurs here, or defect of appellation, because since essence really and identically encompasses the absolute genus and the relative, but formally by the name of essence only the absolute is expressed, a transition is made from "what" to "to something," and one proceeds under diverse formalities, and thus essence under the concept of essence, that is, as it expresses the absolute notion, does not generate, nor is generated, but relation, or rather the relative in the concrete generates and is generated, which nevertheless is essence identically, or is the thing which is essence, not however under the concept of essence, which expresses the absolute what, but under the relative concept it generates or is generated.

And in this these sophisms paralogize, because a transition is made from the concept of essence under appellation, and formally of the absolute to the concept of the relative, or to that which is only identically essence. Wherefore to the major of the argument it must be answered that he who does not beget, nor is begotten, nor proceeds is not the true God, if "true God" and "he" are taken personally, it is true; if taken essentially, it is false: for the Person in God which does not beget, nor is begotten, nor proceeds is the true God, namely the divine essence under the concept of essence, which nevertheless identically is that thing which begets, and is begotten, and proceeds, because that essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. To the proof, however, it is said that there is no God besides the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, because also one God is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and thus is not besides them. But when it is inferred: "Therefore he who does not beget, nor is begotten, nor proceeds, is not the true God," I distinguish the consequent; he who does not beget, nor is begotten, nor proceeds, neither formally, nor identically, and thus is something in reality besides the begetter, and the begotten, and the proceeding, I concede; he who does not beget, nor is begotten formally, but nevertheless identically, is not God, I deny: for essence under the concept of essence formally does not beget, yet it is identically the thing which begets, and the thing which is begotten, that is, the Persons themselves, because essence identically is the relation itself; and thus identically it is the thing which begets, and is begotten, although not formally under the concept and expression of essence.

XLI. To the second sophism, it is answered that those four names are not synonymous, because they do not signify the same thing under the same concept and consideration, although in reality one of them, namely essence, is the same and one with the other three. And thus, as is said in the Lateran Council, canon: "We condemn," on the most high Trinity: "In God there is only Trinity, not quaternity, because any of the three Persons is that thing,

namely substance, essence, or divine nature." For also wisdom and justice, intellect and will are not synonymous names in God, and yet they signify that which in reality and identically is one, yet they signify diverse concepts and formal notions. Hence, although those four names signify true reality, nevertheless not all signify reality distinct and opposed to others: for the first three names Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, because they are relative and opposed among themselves, signify three things relatively distinct; but essence, because it does not signify relation opposed to others, but absolute perfection, signifies indeed a thing, but not opposed to the Persons, and thus identified with them; but although essence does not generate, and the Father generates, this does not argue distinction, because it does not induce opposition of things, but diverse explanation of formalities and concepts: for the thing which is essence generates and is generated, because relations identically are the thing which is essence. But nevertheless, not saying the thing which is essence, but only essence, it explains the formality of the concept of essence as it is distinguished from the concept of relations, and thus under this precision it neither generates nor is generated, as is found in the Lateran Council in the place cited. But for essence not generating to be distinguished from the Father generating, it would be necessary that not only formally, that is, under the concept of essence, but neither identically would it generate; this second, however, is false. But what is said that essence is the root and source of the Persons, is not understood by true emanation, as the proceeding thing flows from its principle, but by a certain similarity, just as essence is said to be the root of attributes, and being of its passions, which nevertheless are not distinguished, but identified with it.

XLII. To the third sophism, it is said that the begotten and the unbegotten through communication in the same nature consubstantially do not differ in genus, nor in species, nor in number in substance, but only by notional relation in Persons. But those things which are related as generable and ingenerable in diverse natures, differ in genus, as heaven and the elements. And when it is said that if they are one God, that God will be begotten, and not begotten, it is answered that that negative is not to be conceded: "God is not begotten," because "not" makes an absolute sense: "In no way is He begotten, in no supposit is He begotten," and this is false. But if it is taken in the force of affirmation, for "He who is unbegotten," thus the same God is begotten and unbegotten with respect to diverse Persons with which God is identified, because in the Father He is unbegotten, or generating, in the Son He is begotten and proceeding. But to what is added, whether being begotten and unbegotten is accident or substance, I say that formally it expresses neither, but only relation under the concept of correlation and opposition to another, which concept, as such, does not express the notion of "in," neither substance nor accident, which pertains to the subject, to that precisely which is to the terminus: but identically it includes substance, and not accident, because it is identified with substance, which is the essence of God, in which no accident is given.

XLIII. Fourthly, they object: To generate is a perfection of the living, this does not belong to the Son: therefore the Son is not equal to the Father in perfection: therefore neither in nature, and thus there are not many Persons of the same nature. Again, when the Son was begotten, either He was, or He was not. If He was, why was He generated? If He was not: therefore He was begotten from the non-existent: therefore He proceeded from potency to act, and was not in act, when He was begotten by the Father; and thus He is not the true God, because at one time He was not. And now, either He is actually begotten, or He has already been begotten, and at one time He was not begotten, and was being begotten, or He has always been begotten. If now also He is begotten: therefore now He does not yet have the last term of His perfection. If He has already been begotten, and is not begotten further, His generation passes, and thus is not eternal because it has ceased, and if at one time He was not begotten, at one time He was not perfect in being. If He has always been begotten, when then was the generation? And how was He in the terminus without the way? Again, the Son must be similar to the begetter, but the word is similar to the object which it expresses, not to the intellect from which it emanates: therefore it is not the Son, because the Son must be similar to the begetter. But if by reason of identity it is similar to the Father, because it is the same with the object; by this reasoning also the Holy Spirit will be similar to the Father, and His Son, because He is identified in the same essence. Again, either that essence common to the three Persons has subsistence in itself, or does not have it; if it does not have it, it lacks some perfection, because subsistence is a perfection of substance, and again it will be a certain incomplete form, and more imperfect than a subsisting form, as an Angel; if it has subsistence: therefore it is incommunicable; and thus it will not be communicated to the three Persons. And again there will be four subsistences, three of the Persons, and one of the common essence, which is to be four Persons; or the Persons will not have proper subsistences, but that which is of essence; and thus there will be only one Person. Again, because this is an expository syllogism: "This essence is the Father," or: "This God is the Father: this God is the Son: therefore the Son is the Father," where all propositions consist of a singular term, nor does the syllogism have a defect: therefore if the consequence is bad, it is because the premises are false, namely because this God is the Son, and the Father. Nor can it be said that inadequately He is the Father, and inadequately He is the Son, and therefore the syllogism does not hold; for against this is, because the whole reality which is in the Father, is in the Son, otherwise the Father would have something which the Son would not have, and consequently the Father would have some perfection, which the Son does not have: therefore adequately the whole is in the whole, and in any of them. Hence neither will the Father be distinguished from the Son, if the whole reality of one is in the other.

XLIV. To the first sophism, it is answered that to generate is a perfection not bare, but affected by relation, or by notional respect to the begotten, and therefore the whole perfection of generation is in the Son: but not under the respect of generating, but under

the respect of begotten; and therefore He does not generate, but is begotten, and it is as great a perfection in God to be generating, as to be begotten, although it is a diverse modification, or respect, because it pertains to the highest perfection of divinity to be three in Persons, of which one is generating, and another begotten, and another proceeding: therefore there is not less perfection in God to generate, than to be generated. And all that of perfection which "to generate" expresses, and all that which is of perfection in to be generated or to proceed, all is in all three Persons, because that perfection is the divine essence itself, which is the basis of having such perfection; but what of relation, and respect is required for generating, or being generated, not all is in all Persons, but each has its relation correlated, and opposed to another; and therefore not all Persons generate, although all have that which is of perfection in generating, not however that which of respect, and relation is required for it.

XLV. To the second sophism, it is said that when the Son was begotten He was, I distinguish; He was through generation itself, I concede; He was without that generation, or was presupposed before generation, I deny, but by that very generation He is what He is. But when it is said: "If He was, why was He generated," I say that if He was without generation, or before generation, in vain was He generated: but if only through generation, not in vain was He generated, since by generation itself He was. But if it is said that when He was generated He already was, or was presupposed before generation, then we deny the supposition, namely that before that generation anything was, or any duration was, in which the Son was not, because that generation is eternal, and coeternal with its generator; and thus nothing can be taken before, nor is any duration or moment imaginable before it, in which either the Son would be supposed to already exist, or nothing to be, so that He would be made from nothing, but He always was, because generation always was: but never is verified the saying of the Arians that "there was, when the Son was not," but in whatever beginning "the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

But when it is inquired whether the Son is now begotten, or has been begotten, and the generation has passed, I say with Augustine in letter 174: "The Father always begets and the Son is always born." For that generation is not some becoming, and way which has passed with the advent of the terminus, since it is not generation made through motion and succession, but is eternal generation, most perfect without motion and succession; and thus it does not pass, but indivisibly the same endures, otherwise it would not be eternal, yet now it is not without its terminus, because that generation since it is always perfect, is always with the terminus, not in potency, and way, or becoming to the terminus: therefore just as eternity now, and from eternity is exactly the same, so that eternal generation is as much the same now as from eternity; and thus that generation now endures, nor has it ceased to be, otherwise it would not be eternal and divine. And just as now and from eternity there is generation, so also its terminus now is, and from eternity, nor is it now

further perfected, or exists, more than before, but always that generation is with its terminus and from eternity it is thus, because it is most perfect, and does not generate through motion and succession. And thus when it is inquired, if He is always begotten, when was the generation, I say that generation and terminus are simultaneous and one, nor is that generation motion and transition or way, so that there be the begotten, but without motion and imperfection there is simultaneously generation and the begotten: for both are eternal.

XLVI. To the third sophism, we will speak below more extensively in treating whether there is absolute subsistence in God. Meanwhile we say what we reported above from St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles IV, ch. 14, solution to the 5th, that essence according to itself is subsistent, if "subsistent" is taken for that which exists per se, and is not inherent, nor existing through another: for thus the divine essence not only is existing per se, but also is being itself, and existence itself. Yet it is not subsistent if "subsistent" is taken for that which is incommunicable to a further terminus: for the divine essence is communicable to the Persons. And we have some kind of example of this matter in created things, although in another part it is very deficient: for the rational soul is per se subsistent, insofar as it can exist separated from the body, yet it is not a person, because it is communicable to the body, and to the complete supposit, which is man. However, the example is deficient, because the rational soul is an informing and incomplete form in itself, but the divine essence is not an informing and incomplete form, but is the whole fullness of being; and thus it demands of itself those three relative personalities, that in them it is rendered incommunicable, and thus those personalities are related as ultimate termini, and of themselves give incommunicability, because they give relative opposition, by reason of which opposition it makes incommunicability: but they have from essence the very notion of existing per se, because essence is being itself from itself. Hence it does not follow that there are four Persons, because person expresses subsistence as incommunicable, and in the ultimate terminus; but absolute subsistence is communicable to the three Persons namely: "This God," because such subsistence says nothing other, than singular substance, as existing per se. Nor does it follow that there is only one Person, namely absolute subsistence, but that there are three Persons with one being, or existence per se, which is absolute subsistence. But of this more must be treated below.

XLVII. To the fourth sophism, it is said that that expository syllogism has a manifest defect because the middle is not perfectly singularized: for just as in syllogisms with a common term, it is required that the middle be perfectly distributed, so in an expository syllogism it is required that the middle be perfectly singularized: as this syllogism is not valid: "Some man is Paul: some man is Peter: therefore Peter is Paul." In the present case, therefore, that term: "This God, this divine essence," although they are singular terms, nevertheless have the force of a common term, because that singular essence is communicated to many

supposits, or persons, which is proper to a common term: and thus we should not use that term as a middle for an expository syllogism, because it is not perfectly singularized, but it should be used as a common term, but then it must be perfectly distributed, as if you say: "Whatever is God, is the Father: something which is God is the Son, etc." But then the major is false. But to what is said, that the whole reality, which is in the Father, is in the Son, etc., I say that the whole absolute reality which is in the Father, is in the Son, not the whole relative reality; and thus the whole God is not adequately in the Father, because He is also in the Son. But how there are not three truths, or goodnesses, although there are three relative things, but there are only three true and good things adjectively, like three divine things, we have already touched on above, and will say something below in the following disputation in treating which predicates are multiplied with the Persons.